EASA rulemaking task (RMT.0049) on CS25.1309
Design improvements may limit the probability of technical failures. With 45 % of fatal accidents involving some sort of technical failures during the past 10 years, this is both a major accident outcome and a precursor of other types of accident. This statement is coming from EASA’s Annual Safety Review 2016. It does not necessarily mean that the technical failure was the direct cause of the accidents, but that a system component failure was identified in the sequence of events of 1 of the 5 fatal accidents in CAT Aeroplanes during the past 10 years (out of a total of 11). This could be an engine failure, an avionics system failure or some other recoverable technical failure. The cause of the accident is usually the result of a combination of circumstances and events that can only be understood after reading the investigation report.
Specific analysis work is ongoing to identify the systemic safety issues that may be present in the domains of airworthiness, maintenance and production. Non-accident data will be used for the analysis
RMT.0049: Specific risk and standardised criteria for conducting aeroplane-level safety assessments of critical systems
To define a standardised criterion for conducting aeroplane-level safety assessment of specific risks that encompasses all critical aeroplane systems on large aeroplanes (i.e. in particular update AMC to CS 25.1309), based on the results of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Airplane-level Safety Analysis Working Group (ASAWG).
In addition, to amend AMC 25.1309 taking into account the latest updates of industry documents, such as ED79A/ARP4754A.
To update CS 25.671 on safety assessment of flight control systems, based on the results of the ARAC Flight Controls Harmonisation Working Group (FCHWG).
For both objectives, harmonisation with the FAA, the Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) and Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC) will be ensured as much as possible.
A decision is expected during Q4 of 2018. See NPA for more details: